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Abstract 
This article uses the example of Russia’s aggressive action against Ukraine 
as an example of a new form of contemporary war fighting, namely hybrid war, 
and discusses how Russia has been successful in exploiting vulnerabilities of its 
opponents. The article reports on the United Kingdom as a case study to discuss 
potential threats and how these can be countered. While using the United Kingdom 
as an example, the ramifications of such a hybrid approach also apply to South 
Africa as a state which is vulnerable in respect to economic warfare, cyberattacks 
and its energy sector. The suggested counteractions could also be seen as lessons 
learned for a future South African scenario. It is a further development of a short 
submission to the Defence Select Committee of the UK House of Commons. 
Introduction 
Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its open support of the 
separatists in the bloody conflict taking place in Eastern Ukraine since 2015 
together with the global war against ISIL/Daesh in Iraq and Syria have brought a 
new terminus of conflict terminology into the dictionary: the term of Hybrid War.3  
This article introduces the concept of hybrid warfare and discusses the 
vulnerabilities arising from the threat of Russia’s potential use of such a mode of 
war fighting against the United Kingdom 
their legal context. In addition, the findings 
of this short contribution will also aid in 
assessing similar threats posed by non-state 
actors such as ISIL/Daesh and with regard 
to evolving new threat scenarios such as 
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China’s increasingly menacing stance in the South Sea with its ramifications for 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members. 
The wealth of opportunity that hybrid warfare offers is extensive and, used 
well, can provide states with the means to do enormous damage, militarily and/or 
commercially, with little risk of attribution, particularly in the realm of cyber 
activity, and with minimum cost in terms of manpower and equipment. The effect 
can be devastating and can undermine vital institutions of the state. In addition, 
they stand a good chance of getting away with it. The general rapporteur to the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has already pointed out:  
Hybrid warfare exploits domestic weaknesses via non-military means (such 
as political, informational, and economic intimidation and manipulation), 
but is backed by the threat of conventional military means. While the 
concept of hybrid warfare is not new, its application by Russia, and to a 
lesser extent by Daesh, against NATO member states’ interests present new 
challenges to the Alliance.4 
For these reasons, states must be prepared to face these new and varied 
threats in order to protect themselves, their citizens and their infrastructure from 
attack. Some of the main types of hybrid threat are set out in the section on forms 
of hybrid warfare. Only by recognising that these threats exist and that are easily 
implemented can the United Kingdom go on to examine how it needs to identify 
any specific threat, assess its potential damage if not countered, and then determine 
the measures it takes to neutralise it – or turn it to its own advantage, once the issue 
of attribution has been determined. Which threshold a hybrid attack must reach 
before it is considered an armed attack is considered below, in the section on the 
challenges to the United Kingdom. Any hybrid attack on a NATO member state, 
which reaches the threshold of an armed attack, would engage the mutual defence 
obligations under the NATO Treaty. The stakes are, therefore, very high.  
Russian doctrinal thinking has been keenly influenced by what has come 
known as “the Gerasimov Doctrine”, 5  which first appeared in the Military-
Industrial Kurier, on February 27, 2013. General Gerasimov wrote,  
In the 21st century we have seen a tendency toward blurring the lines 
between the states of war and peace. Wars are no longer declared and, 
having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template. 
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Hybrid war 
‘Hybrid war’ as a mode of war-fighting is not new and has its origins in the 
concept of ‘hybrid threats’, which was coined in the United States (US) military-
specific literature as a result of the review of the military conflict between Israel 
and Iran-supported Hezbollah during the second Lebanon war of 2006. Hybrid 
threats in the context of asymmetric conflicts mostly consist of a blend of 
unconventional and conventional means of warfare, their tactics and methodology.6  
Hybrid threats outside the context of conventional military conflict can be 
influenced by a variety of factors, which are deliberately provoked by different 
actors, and can be exploited. Hybrid threats are the result of a new enemy (state 
and non-state actors) and a new action spectrum. Such threats pose new challenges 
to policy and rule of law.  
As early as 2010, NATO recognised hybrid threats were a new security risk 
and designed a new NATO Bi-Strategic Command Capstone Concept, describing 
hybrid threats as threats emanating from an adversary who combines both 
conventional and unconventional military methods to achieve its goals. Hybrid 
threats refer to “those posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously 
employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their 
objectives”.  7  
In the following two years, NATO drew up a specific threat catalogue, 
which identifies security-specific risks beyond conventional warfare threats: 
nuclear proliferation, terrorism, cybercrime and cyberwar, organised crime and its 
role in drugs, arms and human trafficking, migration, ethnic and religious conflicts, 
population conflicts due to resource scarcity and globalisation.  
NATO recognised that such threats may amount to a concrete threat to the 
alliance or that NATO could be authorised by the United Nations, because of their 
capacity, to intervene. Recognising this, NATO worked on a related global 
approach (comprehensive approach) in order to counter these risks. This approach 
envisaged involving state and non-state actors in a comprehensive defence strategy 
that combines political, diplomatic, economic, military technical and scientific 
initiatives. Despite intensive work on this approach as part of a ‘countering hybrid 
threats’ experiment in 2011, the NATO project work in 2012 had to stop due to a 
lack of support from their members.  
Given the Russian aggression in Ukraine since 2014, the question arises 
whether the cancelling of this project was not premature. Since 2014, NATO has 
resumed its work on the hybrid warfare project with the aim of determining 
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whether this form of warfare requires a redefinition of Western military doctrine 
(as a new category in full spectrum operations). Whether the application of hybrid 
warfare by Russia will result in a return of the Cold War against the background of 
Russia’s Eastern European hegemonic ambitions, remains to be seen.8 What has 
become clear, however, is that “hybrid warfare ‘has the potential to transform the 
strategic calculations of potential belligerents [it has become] increasingly 
sophisticated and deadly’”.9  
Forms of hybrid warfare  
A hybrid attack may take many forms, and based on available sources, the 
following have been identified as relevant for a developed country such as the 
United Kingdom. The most obvious threat is of cyberattacks on military command 
and control, air traffic control systems, hospital power supplies, the electricity grid, 
water supplies, nuclear power, satellite communications, Internet attacks on the 
banking system, and cyberattacks on dams/water supply and other eco threats. 
One of the oldest forms of hybrid threat is that of espionage and 
surveillance, the purpose of which is to obtain military or commercial secrets. The 
use of spies to infiltrate government and key organisations has the potential to 
provide very valuable information. However, if that espionage is discovered, the 
target state could play the double game and feed disinformation back to the 
targeting state. By way of example, in January 1976, the Concorde, a new 
supersonic aircraft made its maiden flight. It was the product of Anglo–French 
engineering. It shared the skies with a remarkably similar-looking aircraft, the 
Tupolev TU-144, nicknamed ‘Konkordski’. There was a theory that the Anglo–
French Concorde team knew that the then Soviet Union intended to steal their 
plans, so they circulated a set of dummy blueprints with deliberate design flaws. 
The consequence for Konkordski was a rather tragic ending at the Paris air show in 
June 1973, when it “went into an abrupt dive, began to break up and crashed into a 
fireball that consumed a neighborhood in the village of Goussainville”.10  
The use of propaganda/misinformation/PsyOps using the information 
sphere could also be a most effective means of hybrid warfare. This is highlighted 
in several contexts below. 
One aspect which is perhaps not given the attention it should is that of 
foreign investors gaining a controlling interest in essential services, such as energy 
supplies, water supplies, airports and sea ports. This is discussed in the section on 
vulnerability and dependency of essential services, key infrastructure and utilities. 
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The use of populations and migration is discussed below in the section on 
mass migration and hybrid war. This is an aspect, which touches sensitive nerves 
and has been exploited for political as well as military advantage. 
Other forms of hybrid warfare are state-to-state aggression behind the 
mantle of a ‘humanitarian intervention’, and terrorism.  
On the military front, use of special forces – ‘little green men’ – is another 
form of hybrid warfare, demonstrated effectively in Crimea/Donetsk (Ukraine) and 
the denial of their existence by Russia.  
The study on which this article reports, examined some of these hybrid 
methods in more detail and this article highlights relevant legal points where 
appropriate.  
Russia’s use of hybrid warfare 
In a Keynote speech at the opening of the NATO Transformation Seminar 
on 25 March 2015, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg remarked:11 
Russia has used proxy soldiers, unmarked Special Forces, intimidation and 
propaganda, all to lay a thick fog of confusion; to obscure its true purpose 
in Ukraine; and to attempt deniability. So NATO must be ready to deal 
with every aspect of this new reality from wherever it comes. And that 
means we must look closely at how we prepare for; deter; and if necessary 
defend against hybrid warfare. 
To be prepared, we must be able to see and analyse correctly what is 
happening; to see the patterns behind events which appear isolated and 
random; and quickly identify who is behind and why.  
So therefore, we need to sharpen our early warning and improve our 
situation awareness. This is about intelligence, expert knowledge and 
analytical capacity. So we know when an attack is an attack. 
The employment of hybrid methods has been evident from Russia’s 
activities in Crimea and the Donbas region of Ukraine, with its deployment of 
‘little green men’, namely soldiers wearing unmarked uniforms that make direct 
state attribution difficult. According to Mark Galeotti,  
The conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated that Moscow, in a bid to square 
its regional ambitions with its sharply limited resources, has assiduously 
and effectively developed a new style of ‘guerrilla geopolitics’ which 
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leverages its capacity for misdirection, bluff, intelligence operations, and 
targeted violence to maximise its opportunities. However, it is too soon to 
declare that this represents some transformative novelty, because 
Moscow’s Ukrainian adventures have not only demonstrated the power of 
such ‘hybrid’ or ‘non-linear’ ways of warfare, but also their distinct 
limitations.12 
While there may be limitations to the way in which these methods were 
used in Ukraine, the use of unattributable military personnel provides expert 
assistance to an enemy and, even if not directly engaged in hostile acts, provides 
advice and assistance to those who carry out such acts. Nevertheless, the 
seriousness of the threat posed by such forces should not be under-estimated. 
General Breedlove, a former Commander, US European Command (EUCOM) and 
the former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), has been reported as 
saying, “if Russia does what it did in Crimea to a NATO state, it would be 
considered an act of war against the alliance”.13  
In his view –  
The most important thing is that NATO nations are prepared for the so-
called green men: armed military without insignia who create unrest, 
occupy government buildings, incite the population; separatists who 
educate and give military advice and contribute to the significant 
destabilisation of a country … there is a danger that this could also happen 
in other eastern European countries. 
In Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine, modern warfare is described as 
entailing “the integrated utilization of military force and forces and resources of a 
non-military character,” and, “the prior implementation of measures of information 
warfare in order to achieve political objectives without the utilization of military 
force and, subsequently, in the interest of shaping a favorable response from the 
world community to the utilization of military force”.14 
Andrew Monaghan has remarked, “while the term hybrid war offers some 
assistance to understanding specific elements of Russian activity, it underplays 
important aspects discussed by Gerasimov, and offers only a partial view of 
evolving Russian activity, capabilities, and intentions”.15 
Monaghan believes – 
[T]his supposedly new form of war conferred numerous advantages on 
Moscow, observers argued, since it heightened the sense of ambiguity in 
Russian actions, and provided Russian leadership with an asymmetric tool 
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to undercut Western advantages: since Moscow would be unable to win a 
conventional war with the West, it seeks to challenge it in other ways. 
Furthermore, it fits readily into Western debates about the increasing roles 
of special forces and strategic communications in conflict. 
Galeotti points out that16 Russia has invested disproportionate resources 
into the assets most useful for such conflicts, to “reflect how this is a way of war 
which even more explicitly than most targets not the opponent’s military or even 
economic capacity, but their will and ability to fight at all”. 
In Ukraine, Russia employed a hybrid strategy by combining irregular 
warfare (the ‘little green men’) and cyber-warfare to achieve its strategic 
objectives. Reuben F Johnson, writing in IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, on 26 
February 2015, considered that “Russia’s hybrid war in Ukraine ‘is working’.” 
Russia had combined a substantial ground force of 14 400 Russian troops 
supported by tanks and armoured fighting vehicles, backing up the 29 300 illegally 
armed formations of separatists in eastern Ukraine. In addition, they used 
electronic warfare (EW) and  
what appear to be high-power microwave (HPM) systems to jam not only 
the communications and reconnaissance assets of the Ukrainian armed 
forces but to also disable the surveillance unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs) operated by ceasefire monitoring teams from the Organisation for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Russian EW teams have 
targeted the Schiebel Camcopter UAVs operated by the monitors and 
‘melted the onboard electronics so that drones just fly around uncontrolled 
in circles before they crash to the ground’. 
Russian EW, communications and other units central to their military 
operations are typically placed adjacent to kindergartens, hospitals or 
apartment buildings so that Ukrainian units are unable to launch any strikes 
against them without causing unacceptable and horrific collateral 
casualties.17 
These EW activities probably amount to the use of force constituting an 
armed attack by Russia, thereby rendering such EW equipment liable to legitimate 
attack. As such, an international armed conflict would exist. Consequently, 
positioning such assets close to civilians and civilian objects is a breach of the laws 
of armed conflict, in particular Articles 51(7) and 58 of Additional Protocol I (AP 
I), 18  which prohibit the presence or movements of the civilian population or 
individual civilians in order to render certain points or areas immune from military 
operations (use of human shields),  
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[I]n particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to 
shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict 
shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual 
civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to 
shield military operations. 
The commentary to Article 58 points out that this extends to the need for 
care in particular during the conflict to avoid placing troops, equipment or 
transports in densely populated areas.  
Art. 58 AP I provides that parties shall – 
 endeavour to remove the civilian population, individual civilians and 
civilian objects under their control from the vicinity of military 
objectives;  
 shall avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated 
areas; and  
 shall take the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian 
population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control 
against the dangers resulting from military operations. 
While Russia achieved its military objective in Ukraine, namely to create a 
separatist region, Novorossiya, its failure was in the way it was unable to bring 
together its diverse hybrid methods to achieve political success in terms of public 
acceptance of its operations at present and overall legitimacy in the future. Here 
Putin signally failed.19 
Cyberattacks and the information sphere  
The actual risk of a state-originated cyberattack against the United 
Kingdom or another member of NATO is unknown but, as Russia has cyber 
capability, the authors assess this risk as potentially medium to high. 
Cyberattacks which resemble examples of the fifth dimension of warfare, 
refer to a sustained campaign of concerted cyber operations against the information 
technology (IT) infrastructure of the targeted state, including and leading to mass 
web destruction, spam and malware infection.20  
The almost ubiquitous access to the Internet, and the interconnectivity of 
critical systems, makes this form of hybrid warfare a serious and very real threat. 
The effectiveness of cyberattack was graphically demonstrated by the sophisticated 
Stuxnet virus attack on the Iranian nuclear plants. Stuxnet was described as – 
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[O]ne of the most sophisticated pieces of malware ever detected [and] was 
probably targeting ‘high value’ infrastructure in Iran … It is believed to be 
the first-known worm designed to target real-world infrastructure such as 
power stations, water plants and industrial units.21  
Stuxnet has also been described as “the world’s first digital weapon”.22 
This cyberattack was also a clear demonstration of the difficulty of attribution. 
While there were suspicions about which nations in the world possessed the 
technical competence to develop and insinuate such a worm, there was insufficient 
proof. It consisted of – 
[A] 500-kilobyte computer worm that infected the software of at least 14 
industrial sites in Iran, including a uranium-enrichment plant. Although a 
computer virus relies on an unwitting victim to install it, a worm spreads on 
its own, often over a computer network.23 
Cyber-conflict and cyber-warfare are great examples of the use of new 
technologies within the scope of hybrid threats. The combination of new 
technology and its availability make cyber-supported or cyber-led hybrid threats 
potent. Cyber threats strike at the core of modern war-fighting by affecting 
command and control abilities, which have become vulnerable to such 
cyberattacks. In an age of autonomous weapons systems, such as unmanned aerial 
vehicles (drones) and robot fighting vehicles, the potential for cyber intervention 
into their control systems is no theoretical possibility. If the security systems 
safeguarding the autonomous technology can be overridden by hackers, it could 
cause havoc on the battle field: UK weapons targeting an enemy could be turned 
on British soldiers. The concerns of “hijacking risks” were articulated by Huw 
Williams, editor of IHS Jane’s International Defence Review, who said, “It 
remains a concern, no encryption is perfect and there is still the danger that a data 
link can be broken.” Hijacking risks will increase as the system becomes more 
automated, regardless of whether the platform is still controlled by a human 
operator.24 
Russia has been one of the most prolific users of cyber capabilities, and its 
use of cyberattacks against states has been well documented in the past: 2007 
Estonia and 2008 Georgia and now the ongoing cyber operations targeting critical 
infrastructure in Ukraine.25 In 2007, Russia attempted to disrupt Estonia’s Internet 
infrastructure as retribution for the country’s removal of a WWII Soviet War 
Memorial from the centre of Tallinn. Russia also augmented its conventional 
military campaign in Georgia with cyber capabilities, which severely hampered the 
functioning of government and business websites.  
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These cyberattacks are being supported by the use of the information 
sphere where misinformation and propaganda are being used to complement the 
overall Russian-integrated approach to hybrid warfare. Russia uses the media, for 
example, Russia Today, Sputnik News, and members of the public sympathetic to 
Russia who write to newspapers, to spread propaganda and misinformation in a 
highly persuasive and credible way.  
In the present conflict in Eastern Ukraine, Russia has effectively used the 
information sphere as an integral tool in its hybrid war against the people of 
Ukraine 
Vulnerability and dependency of essential services, key infrastructure and 
utilities 
Permitting the sale of essential services and key infrastructure such as 
airports, power stations and other strategic resources such as steel and coal to 
‘foreign’, non-citizen, private and legal owners, lays open a vulnerability to 
potential shutdown and/or dependency thus creating a medium to high risk 
scenario. 
In 2015, the Russian president threatened to cut the vital gas supply to 
Western Europe through Ukraine if financial demands made by Gazprom to 
Ukraine were not met.26 This threat reminded the European Union (EU) of its 
dependency on Russian gas deliveries and also served as a warning not to confront 
Russia’s aggression in East Ukraine. While this incident has to be seen as directly 
linked to the Russian–Ukrainian conflict it also serves as a sombre warning of what 
to expect from Russia in instances of future disagreement and diplomatic/political 
confrontation. Some nations have seen foreign takeovers as a security threat and 
have taken direct action. 27  Russian billionaires have reportedly gained major 
interests in Europe and North America, controlling organisations like football 
clubs, and huge, under-the-public-radar industrial groups.28 In 2015, the UK prime 
minister blocked a deal that could have seen “a group of Russian oligarchs led by 
Mikhail Fridman from seizing control of 12 North Sea gas fields”. 29  In 2014, 
Heathrow Airport Holdings sold three British airports to foreign buyers in a £1 
billion deal. 30  In 2012, the Daily Mail columnist, Alex Brummer, voiced the 
question, “… what happens when most of Britain’s essential public services are no 
longer run by the British? […] Roughly half of all our essential services – from 
water to bridges and ports – now have overseas owners.” The state-owned Russian 
gas conglomerate Gazprom had expressed an interest in – 
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British Gas’s parent company Centrica, gaining access to its 15.7 million 
UK customers. At the time, the Kremlin was using its huge energy 
resources as a political weapon by turning off gas taps supplying the 
Ukraine. If they could do it to the Ukraine, some feared, there was nothing 
to prevent them doing it to us one day. […] many breathed a sigh of relief 
when Gazprom dropped the idea of making an official bid. As former 
Chancellor Alastair Darling remarked: ‘There’s a huge issue and it’s [sic] 
security. Frankly, as we know, if you lose power it is catastrophic. 
Remember the blackout in London a few years ago? It was an accident but 
it paralysed half the City and it was terrifying.’31 
While this was a direct approach, it is possible to conceal a company’s true 
identity through a myriad of subsidiary companies.  
There are similar risks about the nuclear industry. Britain’s nuclear power-
generating plants are controlled by French state energy giant EDF. In October 
2015, EDF agreed a deal under which China General Nuclear Power Corporation 
(CGN) would pay a third of the cost of the £18 billion project for Hinckley Point in 
exchange for a 33.5% stake.32 Four of the big six energy companies, including 
most of the nuclear industry, are foreign-owned. The same goes for British 
seaports, airports and railways.33  
These dependencies are being increased by Europe’s overall dependency 
on foreign energy producers and suppliers.34 This dependency of importing energy 
is a crucial weakness of European energy policies35 and is amplified by Germany’s 
decision to phase out nuclear power by 2022.36 Chancellor Merkel’s ill-thought 
decision in 2011 does make Germany, as the European Union’s biggest economy, 
even more dependent on Russian energy. The same applies to the European Union, 
given its interdependent and shared power transmission grids.  
Electronic warfare 
Russia has a sophisticate electronic warfare capability. Lt Gen. Ben 
Hodges, the US Army’s most senior commander in Europe has described the 
quality and sophistication of their electronic warfare as “eye watering”.37 He noted 
Russia’s modernised jamming and signal direction-finding capabilities and 
outlined that, in Eastern Ukraine, Russian-backed forces employed jammers to 
interfere with drones, which the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe intended to use for monitoring compliance with the Minsk cease-fire 
agreement. “Ukraine’s ground defense systems are being jammed, creating what is 
essentially a ‘no-fly zone.’”38 
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Espionage 
Russia has a well-organised and professional intelligence agency and spy 
network throughout the world. Its activities in London are a matter of public 
record.39 It has operated in the United Kingdom for some time. The notorious 
‘Cambridge Spy Ring’, known by the KGB as the ‘magnificent five’, 40 was a 
cancer at the heart of the UK intelligence service and operated from the late 1930s. 
For the Russians, they were a very successful source of intelligence. “All the 
Cambridge spies caused damage to their country … Philby’s contribution was 
more poisonous. He betrayed the names of as many British agents as he could, 
including lists of all those who had spied for us in Nazi-occupied eastern 
Europe.”41 That Russia took espionage very seriously was evidenced by the fact 
that, by the 1950s, KGB operatives and spies were outnumbering MI5 officers by 
more than three to one.42 
Russia's ‘spying’ activities are both overt – in the sense that aircraft 
intruding into UK airspace are not easily concealed43 – and covert. The presence of 
Russian agents and their methods has been brought once more into sharp focus by 
the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, with one newspaper reporting that the 
“[n]umber of Russian spies in the UK is back to Cold War levels, say security 
services”.44 Espionage is not confined to obtaining military information only but 
also commercial knowledge and plans.  
Methods vary from eavesdropping through the use of ‘bugs’ and 
surveillance devices, to the ‘honey trap’, whereby a young male or female forms an 
intimate relationship with a ‘target’ individual identified as useful for his or her 
contacts, then uses that relationship to insinuate himself/herself into closer ties with 
those contacts, some of whom may be identified as high value, e.g. senior 
scientists, government ministers or senior members of the military.  
While the operations of the intelligence services have the legal constraints 
of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, the Intelligence Services Act 
1994 and copious anti-terror legislation,45 Russian agents operating in the UK do 
not. They can employ intrusive surveillance methods without the same constraints. 
Their accountability is to their superiors in the intelligence service and the military, 
in accordance with the Law on Foreign Intelligence 1992 and the Law on Foreign 
Intelligence Organs 1995.46 This latter provision covers the conduct of electronic 
surveillance in foreign countries. 
Other methods use respectable sounding organisations as a front for more 
sinister activity. The Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers remained affiliated to 
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the International Association of Democratic Lawyers during a period in which it 
was an international front organisation of Soviet intelligence services.47  
Russia has also used infiltration, as described in the section on migration, 
to embed agents. From the end of the 1980s, the KGB and later the SVR (Russia’s 
external intelligence service) began to create “a second echelon” of “auxiliary 
agents in addition to our main weapons, illegals and special agents”.48 These agents 
comprised legal immigrants, including scientists and other professionals. Another 
SVR officer who defected to Britain in 1996 described details about a thousand 
Russian agents and intelligence officers, some of them “illegals” who live under 
deep cover abroad.49 Recently caught Russian high-profile agents in the United 
States are Aldrich Hazen Ames, Harold James Nicholson, Earl Edwin Pitts, Robert 
Philip Hanssen and George Trofimoff. 
Mass migration and hybrid war 
Mass migration, strategically designed and used, has the potential to 
undermine European identity and security. Migration-aided coercion was already 
used by the ousted Libyan dictator, Moammar Gadhafi, to force a lifting of 
European economic sanctions in 2004. Whether the Turkish President Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan employed the same tactic in order to receive direct funds from the 
EU remains to be discussed. What could be established at the time of the writing of 
the article was the growing dependency of Europe on Erdogan’s willingness to act 
as a trustworthy partner. His announcement in the autumn of 2016 to ‘flood’ 
Europe with migrants resembles a ‘weaponisation’ of the migration crisis in terms 
of a hybrid threat scenario. 50  The decision by Germany’s Chancellor Angela 
Merkel, to disregard applicable European law (Schengen and Dublin), when she 
decided to grant Syrians generally asylum status, led to a split within the European 
Union and to diplomatic upsets in the affected EU countries. Mass migration has 
the potential to be used as a geo-strategic weapon: State and non-state actors 
propose deriving financial and political capital out of this situation. This is 
underpinned by the legal requirement for state parties to the 1951 UN Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees to accept those who are fleeing political or other 
forms of persecution (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion). 
The protection of national borders within the framework of national and 
supranational jurisdiction (Schengen) is a necessary condition of state sovereignty. 
Neglecting this international legal principle leads to an erosion of national 
sovereignty and identity, just as the terrorist attacks in Paris during November 2015 
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illustrate the dangers of deterioration of European border controls, partly caused by 
Germany’s migration policy neglect. Both EU and national border controls have 
absolute priority to restrict terrorists in their freedom of movement. Without 
adequate concerted action, the EU principle of free movement of persons is 
permanently eroded.51 
The UK’s laudable adherence to human rights is one such area where its 
strength is, paradoxically, also its weakness. There are two main human rights 
documents of relevance: The Human Rights Act 1998 52  and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).53 These two legal documents provide a 
framework within which UK laws and individual rights are applied and enjoyed, 
guaranteeing basic freedoms, such as the right to life, the prohibition on torture, the 
right to family life.  
In addition, the United Kingdom has ratified the – 
 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(Refugee Convention);54  
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN ICCPR);55  
 United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT);56  
 Convention on the Rights of the Child 199057 (The most important 
of which is the Article 6 right to life, survival and development); and 
 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the involvement of children in armed conflict.58  
In each of these legal documents, there is an onus placed upon each 
signatory state to implement the protections set out. In turn, this means that the 
government is exposed to the prospect of litigation, which, as one sees in the case 
of the United Kingdom, is usually through the medium of the Human Rights Act of 
1998 and ECHR. Under the Convention of the Rights of a Child of 1990, in 
combination with Article 8 of the ECHR (the right to family life), the parents of 
children provided with sanctuary in the United Kingdom are able to seek entry to 
the United Kingdom to be with their children. The misuse of this provision, by 
sending children on ahead, would provide an avenue for terrorist and undesirable 
elements to enter the country.  
It has been suggested that – 
[M]ass migration has the potential to become a hybrid threat exploited by 
state and non-state-actors in order to make Islamist terrorism a real hybrid 
threat. […] Migration aided coercion was already used by the ousted 
Libyan dictator Moammar al Gadhafi, to force a lifting of European 
economic sanctions in 2004.59  
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Using population displacement as a form of warfare, such as that 
graphically shown by the internal armed conflict in Syria, serves two purposes: it 
overwhelms an enemy with the sheer volume of displaced persons, causing internal 
dissent as to how the matter should be resolved and, simultaneously, provides an 
avenue for the infiltration of militants60 who may benefit from the inability to 
employ efficient and rigorous document checks to ascertain the bona fides of each 
entrant. This idea has been described as “stealth jihad”.61  
The situation was serious enough for Pope Francis to express his own 
concerns that ISIS jihadists were ‘infiltrating’ Europe through the refugee crisis,62 
and is a ‘Trojan Horse’-like deception to undermine Western societies. More 
recently, the journalist Con Coughlin wrote along similar lines that the so-called 
Islamic State “terrorist group is exploiting an unprecedented refugee crisis and the 
flames of intolerance it fans to infiltrate European civilisation”.63 As he tellingly 
pointed out, “with an estimated 1.5 million refugees said to have entered the EU in 
2015 … it is virtually impossible to undertake effective scrutiny of everyone 
entering the mainland”. 64  The overwhelming numbers did not permit proper 
investigation of the bona fides of each person presenting as a refugee. Nearly all 
were treated as refugees. Yet, large numbers of single, young men, some with a 
distinctly different ethnic appearance to Syrians, were being admitted without 
demur. 
Large-scale migration can then engender internal discord between those 
focusing on the security threat to the nation and those more focused on the 
humanitarian problem, which, in itself, will be widely reported on by press and TV. 
Internally, the state will find its support structures seriously challenged. As 
Migration Watch 65  points out, pressures will be placed on housing, schools, 
medical facilities and welfare benefits. Local citizens, who are on council waiting 
lists for housing, may find themselves displaced in the queue by migrants, who are 
given higher priority.66 The fact that such attitudes by local officials cause unrest 
and anti-immigrant sentiment is another hybrid factor.  
These attitudes are exacerbated by instances where migrants do not adapt 
to their host communities by either refusing to accept the indigenous culture and 
values or not understanding how their own values are subordinate to those of their 
new home, whether or not they agree with them. The most egregious examples of 
this cultural clash are illustrated in the sexual assaults on women and children, 
which have occurred in the United Kingdom and Europe. 67 
For Europe, this has presented a crisis for the parties to the Schengen 
Agreement,68  with even Germany reintroducing border controls and checks69  – 
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supported by some, but criticised by other citizens. The European Union seems 
close to accepting that its “Schengen open-borders area may be suspended for up to 
two years if it fails in the next few weeks to curb the influx of migrants from the 
Middle East and Africa”. Austrian Interior Minister Johanna Mikl-Leitner, whose 
government has warned it will limit entry to migrants has said, “[e]veryone 
understands that the Schengen zone is on the brink. If we cannot protect the 
external EU border, the Greek-Turkish border, then the Schengen external border 
will move towards central Europe … Greece must … accept help.”70  
These are uncomfortable ideas and the very fact they are regarded as such, 
and that anyone publicly voicing concerns about them might be loudly vilified, is 
another hybrid area of potential exploitation, to dumb-down criticism and 
opposition to the means employed. 
It has been said that President Putin’s “current aim is to foster the European 
Union’s disintegration, and the best way to do so is to flood the European Union 
with Syrian refugees”.71 If this is true, then Russia is using the powerful dynamic 
of Syrian population displacement as a means of hybrid warfare in the context of 
undermining the European Union. Some might say that the referendum decision of 
UK voters, on 23 June 2016, to leave the EU is helping achieve that purpose. 
Lawfare as a strategy of hybrid warfare  
Lawfare is using law as a weapon with a goal of manipulating the law by 
changing legal paradigms.72 Lawfare can be defined “[as] the strategy of using - or 
misusing - law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an 
operational objective”.73 In the case of the current situation in Russia and Ukraine, 
lawfare has its roots in an undefined situation, i.e. the lack of definition of the 
conflict – international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict, or civil 
unrest. This ambiguous situation creates patent confusion as to the source or 
paradigm of applicable law and any eventual action to identify and assign legal 
responsibilities and demand accountability. The aim is to deny the existence of the 
roots, causes and realities of the Russian operations in Crimea and Eastern 
Ukraine, This deniability of reality in fact gives the Western nations the possibility 
to avoid taking responsibility by deferring a decision on the grounds that the 
situation in Eastern Ukraine was not independently verified, that no Russian direct 
involvement was evident, etc. This deniability (often supported by acts of 
disinformation), the lack of definition of the conflict – international armed conflict, 
non-international armed conflict, or civil unrest – make it hard to qualify the nature 
of the conflict and with it to agree on the appropriate course of action in response. 
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Lawfare in the context of the Russo–Ukrainian conflict and Syria can be 
used to camouflage the role the parties play in the conflict. This might take the 
form of state-to-state aggression behind the mantle of a “humanitarian 
intervention”.74  This is the use of “humanitarian intervention” as an excuse to 
intervene in the sovereign affairs of a third-party state. Unilateral action on the part 
of powerful states who purport to cloak themselves superficially in the UN Charter 
as a justification for what they do, has the potential to lower the threshold for 
conflict with those who see things differently. While it is clearly prepared to take 
steps to protect its sphere of influence, as it did recently in Georgia/Ossetia, 
Crimea, Ukraine/Donbas, Russia has shown little appetite for military adventurism 
further afield. It abstained in the UN Security Council over the vote on Libya and, 
having seen how things turned out, in the way the mandate was interpreted and 
implemented as a tool for regime change, it has publicly stated it will not support 
any resolution which calls for the use of force in Syria. Its current operations in 
Syria are in aid of the government, a close ally and a country where it has a keen 
strategic interest, particularly in relation to the naval base at Tartus. Consequently, 
it is not really fighting a proxy war there. However, Saudi Arabia and Iran are. The 
Saudis, Qataris and Turks have armed and supplied the Islamist rebels opposed to 
President Assad, and the Iranians have assisted the government and provided 
military personnel. The United States has reputedly assisted both the ‘rebels’ and 
the government – the CIA have given ‘technical assistance’ to the rebels, some of 
whom are anything but secular, and the US army has provided “US intelligence to 
the militaries of other nations, on the understanding that it would be passed on to 
the Syrian army and used against the common enemy, Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic 
State, to the government.”75 
Allied to this use of ‘lawfare’ within the context of international law is the 
context of UK military involvement in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, where 
claims to UK courts alleging breaches of human rights by members of the armed 
forces were and are being submitted. The expense76 and volume of claims have the 
ability to – 
 Portray the UK’s servicemen and women in an adverse light, thereby 
lowering them in the esteem of the public. This could have an influence 
upon recruiting – who would want to join an organisation that disrespects 
human rights? 
 Have a wider negative propaganda effect outside of the United Kingdom, 
again affecting the United Kingdom’s reputation; 
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 Tie up the Ministry of Defence for months and even years, responding to 
these claims;77  
 Affect the operational effectiveness of the military adversely by leaving 
few options open (Serdar Mohammed);78 
 Affect morale in the armed forces adversely with the concern that every 
aspect of a serviceman’s conduct will be open to scrutiny. This is 
believed may cause them to hesitate to act when decisive action is 
required; 79  
 Effect the slow drip of the operational modus operandi and intelligence 
into the public arena, by which an enemy understands 
restrictions/limitations placed upon the force, which it can then exploit; 
and 
 Damage the ‘control principle’ by which classified intelligence is 
imparted by a second nation to assist with our national security on the 
strict understanding it is not disclosed without the consent of that second 
nation (Binyam Mohammed80). 
The process has been described frankly as “legal mission creep” abetted by 
“significant judicial figures” who “give little or no hint of any pull back by the 
Bench from the ‘judicialisation of war’”.81  
One of the very principles of which the United Kingdom has a proud 
tradition and which it champions throughout the world is, conversely, a 
vulnerability as a form of lawfare. It raises the question whether UK laws permit 
sufficient flexibility to react swiftly to all of the varied forms hybrid attacks might 
take. The very nature of a tolerant society is open to exploitation and abuse through 
the championing of division and heightening ethnic and racial tensions. As has 
been said, “[t]he fundamental characteristic of hybrid attack is that it is designed to 
exploit a country's vulnerabilities”.82 
This can also be augmented by lawfare using the ECHR and democratic 
legal processes to place financial burdens on legal systems by challenging 
decisions on, for example, asylum status, conditions of housing, payable benefits, 
religious freedoms, and using anti-discrimination laws to influence societal 
attitudes. It may also be used by militants who claim they will suffer persecution if 
returned to their home country, or by captured terrorists who want to resist being 
handed over to their state detention authorities. In the egregious case of Serdar 
Mohammed, English courts have been used by a Taliban commander whose 
organisation was trying to kill British soldiers to claim compensation from the 
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United Kingdom for his detention. As pointed out at paragraph 21 of the judgment 
of the Court of Appeal in the case of Serdar Mohammed, 83 there are hundreds of 
cases arising out of the acts of British servicemen in Iraq – and Afghanistan – 
which are awaiting hearing and which have the potential to burden the judicial – 
and legal aid – system for some time, at significant cost to the British taxpayer.84 
Lawfare may be used a means of exploiting the genuine misery and 
suffering of many, for a political or military goal, by creating conditions that make 
life so unbearable where they are, that families uproot and move to safety. That 
crisis may also be used to infiltrate combatants into the destination country.  
The risk for the United Kingdom is high. The threat is on going and, even 
if not directly employed by any particular state, is nevertheless something from 
which an interested party can derive a benefit. 
The challenges: Whether to respond and, if so, how to respond 
This section examines the applicable law, what constitutes an armed attack, 
the threshold for a response and how that response might be delivered.  
International law 
As a member of NATO, any attack upon the United Kingdom would 
invoke Article 5 of the NATO Treaty.85 Importantly, for the purpose of Article 6, 
an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack 
on the territory of any of the parties and on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of 
the parties. Unfortunately, the term ‘armed attack’ is not defined. But it was 
considered in the case of Nicaragua v. United States (1987)86 when it was stated, at 
para 195, that the nature of acts, which can be treated as constituting armed attacks 
include not merely action by regular armed forces across an international border, 
but also “the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars 
or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such 
gravity as to amount to” (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular 
forces, “or its substantial involvement therein”. 
The Court went on to consider the position of assistance by third-party 
states to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other 
support, which it said constituted “a threat or use of force, or amount to 
intervention in the internal or external affairs of other States”. 
The “[d]efinition has been given new life by becoming a major source for 
the negotiations on the definition of the crime of aggression within the jurisdiction 
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of the International Criminal Court”. Drawing upon the General Assembly 
resolution 3314 (XXIX),87 the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on 
the crime of aggression defined in its Article 8 bis (1) a “crime of aggression” as 
the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position 
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military 
action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity 
and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United 
Nations.88 
The threshold requirement is that the act of aggression must constitute a 
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations in the use of armed force by 
a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of 
another state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
An “act of aggression” was itself defined as including the use of armed 
force in any manner inconsistent with the UN Charter, whether or not there is an 
actual declaration of war. It is interesting that the list of activities that qualify as an 
act of aggression does not specifically refer to cyberattacks that have such serious 
consequences, although there is reference to “the use of any weapons by a State 
against the territory of another State”.89 
Under international law, a nation is entitled to use force in three situations: 
 When it is authorised by the United Nations Security Council, 
pursuant to Article 2(4)90 and (7)91 of the UN Charter; 
 In self-defence of itself, under Article 5192 of the UN Charter; and 
 In response to the lawful request by the government of an ally for 
assistance, or collective self-defence (as per the NATO Treaty) also 
under Article 51 (and a matter of customary law). 
Where action is taken under Article 51, in the exercise of the right of self-
defence, it “shall be immediately reported to the Security Council”. If armed force 
is used to respond to an attack, then it must be in keeping with International 
Humanitarian Law, that is, it must not be expected “to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated”.93 
The Nicaragua judgment sets out very helpful guidance on the definition of 
‘armed attack’ and ‘aggression’. It is therefore important to consider how this 
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translates into acts which are less easy to identify as a use of force, such as 
cyberattacks. It is suggested that disruption of a military national defence facility 
could easily cross the threshold where, for example, national air defence systems 
are disabled. But, an attack disabling the banking system, while disruptive, may 
not. Other problems relate to what the status is of civilians involved in 
cyberattacks, and which implications cyber offences can have for neutral states.94  
Whether any form of hybrid attack, alone or cumulatively, amounts to a use 
of force and, if so, reaches the threshold of an ‘armed attack’ to justify a military 
response under article 51 – and what form that response would take – are very 
difficult questions to answer. They are situation/fact-specific. Moreover, attribution 
is likely to be very problematic. Devastating cyber infiltration can be achieved by a 
single operator who would be difficult to track and it would be even more difficult 
to lay attribution to any particular state. In relation to the Stuxnet worm, while very 
few nations had the level of expertise necessary to produce such a virus, direct 
attribution has remained elusive.95 
The Tallinn Manual96 discusses the legal framework applicable to cyber-
warfare and, in particular, what constitutes a use of force (rule 11), what constitutes 
a threat of force (rule 12), the permissible responses (rules 13–15), based upon 
Article 51 of the UN Charter, and the applicability of the law of armed conflict 
(Part II). 
Rule 11 defines a cyber operation as constituting a use of force when its 
scale and effect are comparable to non-cyber operations rising to the level of a use 
of force. This is not limited to the use of such means by the military but would also 
include, for example, the intelligence services, under the principles of state 
responsibility and attribution.97 A fortiori, if conduct is directed or controlled by a 
state.98 However, according to the commentary to rule 11 of Tallinn (use of force), 
“non-destructive cyber psychological operations intended solely to undermine 
confidence in a government or economy do not qualify as uses of force” (ibid., §3), 
Moreover, “merely funding a hacktivist group conducting cyber operations 
as part of an insurgency would not be a use of force”. The authors consider that, 
under the principles of the Nicaragua case, “providing an organised group with 
malware and the training necessary to use it to carry out cyber attacks against 
another state” (ibid., §4) would constitute a use of force. 
In considering whether an act constitutes a ‘use of force’ and amounts to an 
‘armed attack’ the authors determined that the Nicaragua judgment set out the 
applicable criteria. (ibid., §6).  
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Tallinn acknowledges that the question of what actions short of an armed 
attack constitute a use of force is still unresolved (ibid., §8). Where the harm 
caused is significant (rule 13), then there is clearly an armed attack. This is, 
however, still an evolving area of law and it is difficult to assess what a given 
nation would regard as ‘significant’ for the purposes of such a classification. Even 
assuming that the threshold has been met, a response will also depend upon 
whether the nation attacked has the capability to respond militarily or via other 
means. While cyber responses can be an effective option in self-defence, the 
problem of accurate attribution remains. The elements of an internationally 
wrongful act of a state are set out in Article 2 of the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001. This provides,  
There is an internationally wrongful act of a state when conduct consisting 
of an action or omission: 
(a) is attributable to the state under international law; and 
(b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the state. 
As a matter of pragmatism, it is suggested that attribution requires 
absolutely incontrovertible proof that an attack emanated from a specific country, 
from its military or government departments, and that it was of such a nature as to 
cross the legal threshold, any response could be itself construed as an act of 
aggression. How does one decide that it is an official act of state, conducted by 
organs of a state99 and not some rogue computer boffin with access to an official 
computer who has, for example, decided to hack into the another nation’s missile 
defence system and disable it? To the observer, this use of an official government 
computer would look like a genuine cyberattack by the state from which it 
originated.  
On the other hand, what should the targeted state do when the state from 
which the attack originates denies that it was the act of any of its officials, even 
though it is suspected by the victim state that this is untrue? This is ostensibly an 
act of state, but is pleaded to be by a rogue and unauthorised element, acting 
without authority. It is quite different to the situation of, for example, a missile 
launch. First, such weapons system would be under control of the state’s military 
and access to them is severely restricted. Secondly, a rogue soldier operator of the 
system cannot easily initiate an attack sequence without attracting serious attention. 
The more powerful the weapon, the more controls there are over it. Hence, the 
explanation for the cyberattack may be considered more credible.  
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Matters are even further complicated where, for example, a particular 
system, e.g. missile defence, is placed under the authority or control of another 
state.100 In those circumstances, the rules state,  
[T]he conduct of an organ placed at the disposal of a State by another State 
shall be considered an act of the former State under international law if the 
organ is acting in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority of 
the State at whose disposal it is placed.101 
In his article, “Historical background and development of codification”, 
Crawford has said,  
[T]he right to invoke responsibility is not necessarily co-extensive with the 
circumstance of being the victim of the breach of an international 
obligation: the injured State may not be the only one entitled to invoke 
responsibility for an internationally wrongful act, although injured States 
should retain priority in terms of any response.102 [emphasis added] 
In the context of foreign ownership of essential utilities, e.g. the planned 
nuclear power installation at Hinkley Point, the construction costs for which will be 
paid for by the mainly state-owned EDF of France and state-owned CGN of 
China,103 an attack on such installations may indeed prove to be so significant as to 
constitute an armed attack. While the state on whose territory the installation is 
based (United Kingdom) may, for whatever reason, deem it imprudent to make a 
military response, is the nation which has invested financially in it constrained by 
that view? Does the loss of its significant and expensive investment mean it, too, is 
it an ‘injured state’? 
It is always open to a state to choose to respond in self-defence if it 
perceives the threshold for an armed attack upon it has occurred, but within the 
framework of significant hybrid attacks the problem of attribution remains 
challenging. 
Conclusion 
Russia has been carrying out espionage for many years, and regularly tests 
UK defences. Nevertheless, it has not displayed any intent to attack the United 
Kingdom by conventional means. UK membership of NATO may be a key factor 
in this, or it may be just coincidental, as it is far from Russian borders. Or simply, 
Russia has nothing to gain from such a move given its elites’ interests and presence 
in the UK’s public life, educational system and economy? 
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Therefore, a major question still to be decided is how much of a real threat 
it is to the United Kingdom in general. It is doubtful that Russia’s hostile interest 
extends as far as the United Kingdom, as its traditional sphere has been with its 
neighbouring countries which provided it with a security buffer. Having said that, 
one might argue that Russian operations in Syria show that it casts a predatory eye 
much further afield. But, this is to be seen from the perspective of assistance to its 
Syrian ally, and where it has genuine interests of its own. Russia’s operations there, 
to aid its ally the Syrian government, were not a direct threat to Western interests 
and, far from much of the criticism directed to it, are quite understandable in that 
context. In contrast, Syria is of strategic importance to Russia and there is also the 
serious threat of Islamic terrorism so close to its borders, which is of genuine 
concern to the Kremlin.104 Russian involvement in Syria has been described often 
pejoratively by Western media and policymakers as an intervention.105  This is 
incorrect, as Russia has come lawfully to the assistance of an ally that has faced 
internal and, to a considerable extent, external threats. Its operations in Syria are 
therefore with the consent of the Syrian government. This is in stark contrast to the 
involvement there of other nations who have allied with, and/or provided 
assistance to, militants fighting the government. 
As was pointed out in the New York Times, “The liberal interventionists … 
seem to have forgotten that Syria has been Moscow’s client since early in the Cold 
War – a situation Washington was willing to live with when the geostrategic stakes 
were much higher.”106  
The events in Crimea (home to the Russian Black Sea Fleet) and Ukraine 
(sharing a common history, home to many Russians and Russian speakers), similar 
to the situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, are illustrative of Russia’s assertion 
of its right to defend its ‘citizens’ abroad, and tend to be more easily understood if 
seen through that prism, so that the vulnerability of these states to the Russian bear 
is more easily comprehended. That is not to justify what happened, but merely to 
understand why it did.  
All the same, events in Crimea and Ukraine have shown how the UK 
government must become “alert to the use of reflexive control techniques and find 
ways to counter them if [we are] to succeed in an era of hybrid war”.107 They have 
been useful in highlighting the limitations of hybrid warfare. In East Ukraine, 
Russia combined ‘little green men’ and virulent propaganda against the 
government in Kiev. However, Galeotti points out –  
The very disarray in Kiev, which had worked to Moscow’s advantage over 
Crimea, now proved a serious problem, as there was no one there able or 
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willing to make the kind of politically ruinous concessions the Russians 
were demanding. Instead, a ‘short, victorious little war’ … turned into a 
‘bleeding wound’…108 
What these events reveal is that Russia will defend its geostrategic 
interests. But that is quite different to openly attacking a country like the United 
Kingdom, which is far removed from Russia’s sphere of interest as it sits firmly 
within NATO. So, direct use of force against the United Kingdom is currently 
assessed as highly unlikely. 
Notwithstanding the absence of any perceived hostile intent for a 
conventional attack, hybrid warfare offers Russia more subtle ways of undermining 
British society and values. The distinct advantages of cyber warfare are all too 
apparent, as attribution is very difficult. Six years after Stuxnet, there is still no 
direct attribution, even though the capability to produce such a sophisticated 
program resides with only a small number of nations and organisations.  
General Valery Gerasimov was quite clear when, drawing upon the lessons 
of the so-called Arab Spring, he said, “The role of nonmilitary means of achieving 
political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the 
power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.”109  
Galeotti candidly added the rider,  
In other words, this is an explicit recognition not only that all conflicts are 
actually means to political ends – the actual forces used are irrelevant – but 
that in the modern realities, Russia must look to non-military instruments 
increasingly.110 
It is clear that Russia has successfully employed several hybrid methods of 
warfare in recent times, and that it is skilled in so doing. It has also successfully 
employed conventional forces in Syria, which have changed the course of the civil 
war in favour of President Assad. Its prowess and confidence have grown. In 
response, NATO has deployed a missile shield to Poland and Romania, to deter 
any resurgent and over-confident military move by Russia. In turn, Russia has 
deployed Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad, the Russian territory between Poland 
and Lithuania that is the most militarised zone in Europe.111 This military posturing 
may itself be a form of hybrid warfare, as he who ‘blinks first’ will be regarded as 
the weaker party. The danger is if this face-off escalates, direct conflict may 
become more likely. 
While the United Kingdom may not be under imminent threat of traditional 
armed attack from Russia, it must defend against the sub-threshold corrosion 
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evident through espionage, propaganda and disinformation, that gnaws away and 
undermines its security and society, and ensure that any responses are measured 
and in accordance with international law. 
At a more strategic level, governments have tried to make predictions on 
the future threats they will face, and produced commensurate defence assessments 
– in the case of the United Kingdom, to reduce its conventional forces. The public 
has been fed platitudes about leaner and more efficient forces, as a euphemism for 
cost-cutting. This has been wrong and has, as a result, placed the nation at 
dangerously low force levels, purporting to identify new threats, which diminish 
the importance of more conventional forces.112  While some of this thinking is 
driven by national austerity measures, the absence of any senior government figure 
who has experienced the rigours of combat plays a significant part too, as there is a 
signal lack of appreciation of what is needed to produce an efficient and capable 
force.113 Indeed, that lack of military acumen is, in itself, a potential hybrid threat, 
which an enemy could exploit.  
In truth, there is no single type of threat that the nation faces, nor does each 
threat stand in isolation. Hybrid warfare can mix and match the obvious with the 
most subtle. What Russia's interventions in Crimea and East Ukraine have shown is 
that there are many and varied challenges to be met, in addition to the conventional 
threat. The United Kingdom must have the force levels to meet them and the 
capability to work in an integrated way with its national security agencies and 
strategic allies. 
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